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    Abstract 
 
 
This paper reviews and evaluates the Bank of Japan (BOJ)’s monetary policy during the 
period  1998-2005.  In  doing  so,  it  pays  particular  attention  to  the  development  of 
academic thinking on what central banks can do at or near zero interest rates and its 
relationship with the actual policy measures adopted by the BOJ. The paper argues that 
the BOJ has done most of the things recommended by academic economists. The most 
important  of  these  is  expectations  management  as  crystallized  in  the  so-called  zero 
interest rate policy. The academic origin of this policy can be found in the seminal work 
of  Krugman.  The  paper points  out,  however,  that  this  fact,  unfortunately,  remained 
unnoticed by many, and explores reasons behind. The paper then goes on to survey the 
empirical literature on the effects of the measures adopted by the BOJ. The literature has 
found that the zero interest rate policy has had significant effects on the term structure 
of  interest  rates  and  supported  the  economy.  Finally,  the  paper  discusses  possible 
reasons for the failure of such measures to stop the deflation of the economy within a 
short  period  of  time.  It  points  out  some  difficulties  inherent  in  the  expectations 
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1.    Introduction 
This  paper  aims  to carry  out  an informal  review of the Bank  of Japan  (BOJ)’s 
monetary policy during the last 6-7 years. This has been an interesting period for any 
student of monetary policy. Figure 1 places in perspective the difficulties the BOJ has 
faced. The BOJ roughly  doubled base money  during  the  period  with  no  discernible 
effects  on  nominal  GDP  or  the  price  level  (the  lower  half  panel  of  Figure  1), 
contradicting the standard prediction of monetarism. As a result, the velocity of money 
has declined sharply (upper chart). More importantly, the period has been one of near 
zero nominal short-term interest rates. The BOJ has adopted a number of non-traditional 
monetary policy measures to get around the difficulties generated by near zero interest 
rates--not just an expansion of base money. The impaired financial system, however, as 
indicated by declines in bank loans in the chart, has severely limited the effectiveness of 
the BOJ’s policy measures. A brief survey of the measures adopted by the BOJ and the 
discussion of their effects are provided in this paper. 
The period has also been an interesting one in terms of the relationship between 
academic ideas and actual monetary policy making. Academic thinking, without doubt, 
has been useful for the BOJ to formulate its policy. Some of the measures adopted had 
origins  in  the  work  of  academic  economists.  The  BOJ,  however,  adopted  them  not 
directly at the recommendation of economists, but as a natural evolution of the course of 
policy they were following. Some did not realize the similarity between the measures 
adopted by the BOJ and those advocated by academic economists, and continued to 
argue  for  the  BOJ’s use of bold methods  to overcome deflation. This  gap  has  only 
recently begun to be filled by serious economic analyses of the BOJ’s monetary policy.   
The  paper  begins,  in  the  next  section,  with  a  brief  historical  summary  of  the 
evolution of the economy and the BOJ’s monetary policy during the period. The core of 
monetary policy during  the  period  has  been  the  so-called Zero Interest  Rate Policy 
(ZIRP) introduced early in 1999. The ZIRP has been an attempt to affect expectations of 
future monetary policy, rather than to change today’s policy instrument. In this sense, 
such a policy is often called an  exercise  in expectations management or in shaping 
expectations. The section explains how the BOJ had arrived at the idea of the ZIRP. The 
BOJ terminated the ZIRP in 2000, but introduced the Quantitative Easing Policy (QEP) 
in early 2001. I explain what the QEP has been and point out that it has included a 
version of the ZIRP, which in fact may have been the most important aspect of the QEP. 
In  section  3,  I  summarize  what  now  appears  to  be  the  academic  consensus 
concerning what central banks can do at or near the zero lower bound (ZLB) on interest 
rates. The measures adopted by the BOJ are re-summarized in this light. Given the   2 
difficulties banking sector problems have caused for the BOJ, however, it is important 
to see the BOJ’s policy measures from yet another perspective. Many of the monetary 
policy measures adopted have had the purpose of mitigating financial sector problems 
and,  through  that,  of  contributing  to  the  fight  against  deflation.  This  perspective  is 
explained in section 4. In section 5, I go on to discuss in more detail the academic 
background for the ZIRP. I argue that, among others, a series of work by Krugman was 
the  origin of the ZIRP. Since at  the  ZLB  nominal  interest rates cannot be  lowered, 
further stimulus must come through changes in expectations about policy or interest 
rates when the economy is no longer stuck at the ZLB. Krugman had explained the idea 
in terms of the quantity of money, not nominal interest rates. The two are, however, the 
two sides of the same coin. The BOJ has been the first central bank to implement such a 
policy. The BOJ, however, initially carried out something close to what Krugman was 
proposing with reference to interest rates, and not to the quantity of money. Perhaps, 
this is one of the reasons for the apparent communication failure between the BOJ and 
the outside world in the early stages of the ZIRP. 
  In  section  6  I  turn  to  a  review  of  the  recent  empirical  literature  that  tries  to 
estimate the effects on the economy of the ZIRP and other measures adopted by the BOJ. 
Most of this literature has found significant effects of the ZIRP on the term structure of 
interest rates. The effects have been larger at the short to medium part of the yield curve, 
consistent with what theory about the ZIRP predicts. Evidence on the effects of other 
aspects of the BOJ’s policy such as targeted asset purchases and the expansion of bank 
reserves on asset prices is at best mixed. There is, however, some evidence that the 
BOJ’s measures to contain financial sector problems have been partially successful.           
Despite some such effects on interest rates and possibly on other asset prices, the 
BOJ’s policy has failed to stop the deflation of the economy within a short period of 
time. In the last section of the paper I speculate on the causes of the weak effects of the 
BOJ’s policy on the economy. The discussion is divided in two parts. In the first, I point 
out some of the weaknesses of the ZIRP and other attempts at expectations management. 
These include  the  need  for non-monetary policy forces  to  lift the economy  and  the 
possible time inconsistency problem of the approach. In the second part, I discuss the 
way problems  in the financial system  have  hindered  the  effectiveness  of  the  BOJ’s 
policy. This is a much cultivated area. I argue, however, that the BOJ’s policies eased 
problems for the relatively healthier part of the financial system and for banks, but not 
for the rest, especially borrowers with low credit standings. As such, they may have 
fallen  short  of  lifting  the  economy  into  positive  inflation  territory,  but  at  least 
contributed  to  avoiding  a  meltdown  of  the  financial  system  and  an  accompanying   3 
deflationary spiral. 
 
2.    Recent Development of the Economy and Monetary Policy in Japan 
In this section we will provide a brief review of the recent development of the 
economy and of monetary policy in Japan. Japan’s macroeconomic experience during 
the last two decades has been quite extraordinary. Stock and land prices soared to their 
peaks  in  the  late 1980s  and early  1990s respectively,  giving  way  subsequently  to  a 
decade long correction process. In April 2003, TOPIX reached a low of 773.1, the level 
where it was back in 1984. Declining asset prices have hit the banking system severely. 
Public money, bank earnings and bank capital amounting to about 20% of GDP have 
been used to address the bad loan problem. Business fixed investment has suffered from 
the excesses of the late 1980s and the impaired financial system. The economy has 
grown at a minimal 1.0% rate on average during 1992-2002, a “lost decade” as some 
people put it.   
The weak economy has affected general prices. The CPI has been declining since 
1998. The BOJ started to ease in the summer of 1991, and then lowered the call market 
rate by almost 800 basis points in the following four years, bringing the rate to below 
0.5% in the summer of 1995.   
As a result, the BOJ had little room for further reductions in interest rates already 
in 1995 (Figure 1). Roughly speaking, the economy has been in a liquidity trap since 
then. The BOJ maintained the uncollateralized overnight call rate, the operational target 
of policy since the mid 1990s to early 2001, as low as approximately 0.5 percent from 
September 1995 through September 1998 to stimulate the economy and to contain the 
emerging strains in the financial system. The financial strains became even more serious 
in the fall of 1998 and the BOJ cut the rate to 0.25% in September 1998. Despite this, 
the CPI inflation rate moved into negative territory in the second half of 1998. The 
weakness in the economy, financial stresses and the call for further monetary easing did 
not dissipate. The BOJ then successively lowered the overnight call rate to virtually 
zero percent in February and March of 1999. During late March in 1999, the overnight 
call market rate was at 0.03% and the rate had literally hit the ZLB. 
Although there were some improvements in the economy, inflation stayed in the 
negative range.  The  BOJ  thus continued its exploration for further  monetary easing 
measures. Many options were discussed, including targeting bank reserves/ base money, 
moving the zero target out the yield curve, the sale of put options on government bonds 
and so on. These, however, were not adopted for one reason or another. In the end, 
some of the board members came to the view that the length of time during which a   4 
zero  rate  is  maintained  could  become  an  instrument  of  policy.  The  so-called  zero 
interest  rate  policy  (ZIRP)--the core of  the  BOJ’s monetary  policy  since 1999--was 
introduced in April 1999.
1    The ZIRP was not just a zero short-term interest rate, but a 
commitment to maintain it until a pre-announced condition was fulfilled.    Specifically, 
the then BOJ Governor Masaru Hayami announced in April 1999 that the Bank would 
continue the zero interest rate “until deflationary concerns were dispelled”. As I discuss 
in the next section, alternative policy measures discussed at the time shared the same 
characteristic,  i.e.,  affecting  expectations  of  future  monetary  policy  moves  and  thus 
short-term interest rates. 
In August 2000, the BOJ lifted the ZIRP and raised the overnight call rate to 0.25 
percent,  since the economy  was  recovering  and showing  some  signs  of overcoming 
deflation.    In  late  2000,  however,  the  economy,  reflecting  a  global  decline  in  the 
demand for high tech goods, began to deteriorate. This raised deflationary  concerns 
again. The BOJ lowered the policy interest rate to 0.15 percent in February 2001, and 
then adopted the QEP in March 2001. The QEP is still in effect as of the writing of this 
article (June 2005). 
The QEP has consisted of three pillars.    First, the BOJ has maintained an ample 
liquidity  supply  by  using  the  current  account  balances  (CAB)  at  the  BOJ  as  the 
operating  policy  target.    Second,  the  BOJ  has  committed  itself  to  maintaining  the 
provision  of  ample  liquidity  until  the  rate  of  change  of  the  core  CPI  (nationwide, 
excluding perishables) becomes zero percent or higher on a sustained basis.    Third, the 
BOJ has increased the amount of purchases of JGBs from time to time as a tool for 
liquidity injection.    It was projected that increasing the CAB targets beyond the level 
of the required reserves would normally keep the call rate near zero percent.
2    Thus, 
with the commitment to maintain ample liquidity provision until deflation ends, the 
QEP has contained a version of the ZIRP.    The details of this commitment were further 
clarified in October 2003, with the BOJ stating its intention to continue providing ample 
liquidity until both actual and expected inflation become  zero percent or higher.
3  In 
addition  to  the  ZIRP  element,  the  QEP  can  be  regarded  as  consisting  of  liquidity 
provision beyond that necessary for a zero rate and purchases of long-term government 
                                                    
1  See, for example, Ueda (2002) for a more detailed account of the BOJ’s monetary policy in 
this period. 
2  In  fact, the uncollateralized  overnight call rate declined to 0.001 or 0.002 percent, almost 
literally to zero percent, during the QEP period, while it declined to at most 0.01 percent during 
the ZIRP period. 
3  For further details on the QEP, see the BOJ’s website (http://www.boj.or.jp).   5 
bonds. 
    The  target  CABs  increased  from  approximately  5  trillion  yen  at  the 
introduction of the QEP in March 2001, an amount roughly 1 trillion yen greater than 
the then-required CABs, to a range of approximately 30-35 trillion yen in January 2004. 
The increases in CABs have been provided mainly by market operations, including the 
BOJ’s purchases of JGBs.    The amount of monthly purchases of JGBs has been set and 
pre-announced by the BOJ.    This amount was equivalent to 0.4 trillion yen per month 
in March 2001 and was gradually increased to 1.2 trillion yen by May 2004.   
 
3.    “State of the Art” View on Monetary Policy at the ZLB   
Initial discussions on what central bank can do at or near the ZLB were very 
confusing  probably  because  this  was  essentially  a  new  subject  in  the  economics 
profession. A large literature, however, has now developed on this. A useful survey of 
the  literature  is  provided  in  Bernanke  and  Reinhart  (2004),  who  present  what  now 
appears to be roughly the consensus view on the issue. They discuss three alternative 
monetary policy strategies for stimulating the economy without lowering the current 
policy  rate.    They are: (i) shaping or  managing interest-rate  expectations --  that is, 
providing assurance to the private sector that policy rates will be lower in the future 
than currently expected; (ii) altering the composition of the central bank’s balance sheet 
to change the relative supplies of securities in the market (targeted asset purchases); and 
(iii) expanding the size of the central bank’s balance sheet beyond the level required to 
set the short-term policy rate at zero. We will later provide a detailed examination of 
strategy (i) above as practiced by the BOJ.   
On  strategy  (ii),  many  concrete  proposals  have  been  made,  including  buying 
long-term government bonds, equities and foreign exchange. The rationale behind these 
proposals  is  not  always  clear.  Most  proponents  of  the  approach,  however,  seem  to 
assume  that  changes  in  the  relative  supplies  of assets  generate  asset  price  changes, 
which in turn affect aggregate demand. We should also note that purchases of long-term 
government bonds as a strategy to affect government bond yields somewhat overlap 
with strategy (i). Of course, it is possible to argue that strategy (i) affects expected 
future short rates, while outright purchases of bonds affect the risk premium component 
of interest rates. 
The rationale behind strategy (iii) is also not very clear. Bernanke and Reinhart 
(2004), however, discuss three possible channels through which strategy (iii) may affect 
the economy: (a) the portfolio rebalancing effect, whereby increases in the monetary 
base  would  lead  the  private  sector  to  rebalance  its  portfolios,  lowering  yields  on   6 
alternative, non-monetary assets; (b) altering expectations of the future path of policy 
rates  by  a  visible  act  of  setting  and  meeting  a  high  reserve  target;  and  (c)  the 
expansionary  fiscal  effect,  whereby  the  central  bank  replaces  public  holdings  of 
interest-bearing government debt with non-interest-bearing currency or reserves, thus 
replacing  the  expected  future  tax  liability  for  the  public  with  an  inflation  tax.  For 
channel (c) to produce meaningful effects, the growth rate of base money, however, has 
to  be  unusually  high.  Also,  the  liquidity  supplied  will  have  to  be  in  the  economy 
permanently.  Otherwise, there will be  a period of negative  seigniorage  growth.  The 
theoretical rationale behind channel (a) is not obvious. For example, an exchange of 
base money for treasury bills with a zero rate does not seem to force agents to rebalance 
their portfolios. At this point, however, it seems fair to say that we need to wait for 
evidence  for/against  the  presence  of  such  a  channel  and  based  on  this,  to  think 
theoretically about why that is so.   
In addition to the above three strategies, some have argued for guiding short rates 
into negative territory. This would generate obvious effects on the economy. Beyond a 
certain point,  this strategy,  however,  will  require  taxing  currency.  The  practical  and 
socio-psychological difficulties involved seem daunting. 
The BOJ can be seen to have adopted all three of the strategies as summarized 
above. Both the ZIRP and the ZIRP element of the QEP are examples of strategy (i). As 
a possible case of the adoption of strategy (ii), we can point to the BOJ’s purchases of 
JGBs in the QEP period.    Such purchases may generate portfolio rebalancing effects, 
although none of the BOJ’s statements have mentioned any intent to produce this sort of 
effect. The expansion of the CABs at the BOJ in the QEP period is an example of 
strategy (iii). In section 6 we will review empirical works that test for the presence of 
the effects of such strategies. 
 
4. Targeting Soft Spots in the Financial System   
The above summary of what the BOJ has been doing seems to miss an important 
aspect. In many instances, the BOJ has been using above strategies to fight deflation, 
but through a specific transmission channel. That is to say, the last 6-7 years were a 
period of  financial  stresses.  Liquidity and  risk  premiums rose  in many parts  of the 
financial system from time to time. The rise in premiums led to a sharp contraction in 
economic activity in late 1998. Similar, though less serious, stresses were felt in 2001 
and 2002. As a result, many of the BOJ’s recent operations have tried to target “soft 
spots” in the channels of financial intermediation in order to contain the stresses or the 
rise  in  risk  premiums.  Put  differently,  under  financial  instability,  interest  rates  on   7 
instruments  involving  credit risks can  become  fairly  high  even  if rates on  risk free 
instruments are near the ZLB. Strategies (i)-(iii) can then be used to contain such rise in 
interest rates. If successful, the measures would contribute to financial stability and, as a 
result, to fighting deflation, although at the cost of somewhat undermining the price 
mechanism in credit markets. 
For  example,  since  the  credit  crunch  of  1998,  the  BOJ  has  expanded  its 
fund-providing operations using  commercial papers  (CP)  as collateral  (strategy  (ii)). 
This move is believed to have added to the liquidity of the CP market and, in turn, led to 
declines in issuing costs. In addition, the BOJ has started to accept as collateral asset 
backed securities (ABS) since October 1999.   
In  the  spring  of 2003  the  BOJ  went  further by  its  decision  to purchase  asset 
backed CPs (ABCP) and ABSs outright (again, strategy (ii)). This reflected the BOJ’ 
perception that the markets for these instruments were still in their infancy and that they 
would develop further by some risk taking by the BOJ. The development of the market 
would allow participation by a wider range of investors and ultimately result in declines 
in fund raising costs for borrowers and, at the same time, in easier unloading of loans by 
financial institutions.   
Even the ZIRP, strategy (i), may be seen to involve an attempt to contain money 
market risk premiums by a promise of a zero rate, therefore, the absence of liquidity 
concerns as long as deflation persists. In addition, the BOJ has expanded the supply of 
liquidity  at  any  serious  signs  of  financial  stress  since  late  1998  (strategy  (iii)). 
Increasingly, the BOJ has lent long in the money market. As of April 2001, the start of 
the QEP period, fund supplying operations had maturities of one to three months. In 
March 2005, some operations were of 11 month maturity. During the QEP period, such 
operations have been associated with either a rise in the target on the CAB or activation 
of the special clause in the policy directive, which said that the CABs can temporarily 
exceed the upper limit of the target range should concerns over financial stability raised 
liquidity demand. In addition, in some of its operations the BOJ has been taking, to 
varying degrees, the credit risk of counterparties or of issuers of instruments traded, as 
explained above. As a result, the distinction between monetary and prudential policies 
has become less clear.
4  In other words, monetary policy tools near the ZLB have been 
                                                    
4  Separately, the BOJ had established a standby scheme that allows banks to sell 
equities they hold to the BOJ since December 2002. This again was a measure to target 
a soft spot in the financial system, i.e., banks’ vulnerability to declines in stock prices. 
Banks can certainly sell stocks in the market. Given the then low liquidity of the market, 
however, banks may have been reluctant to sell stocks and lower prices themselves. 
Also, banks reportedly hesitated to sell stocks they own on a large scale in view of the   8 
used by the BOJ partly in an attempt to ensure financial stability, and through it, price 
stability.   
 
5. The Relationship Between the Literature and the BOJ’s Monetary Policy 
As I stated in the section 3, it is only recently that the profession has come to 
regard  the  Bernanke  &  Reinhart  summary  presented  in  the  last  section  as  the 
middle-ground view on monetary policy near the ZLB. Some very different views were 
initially expressed by various authors. The academic work, however, that came close to 
proposing at an early stage what the BOJ has been doing is Reifschneider and Williams 
(2000). Studying what a central bank can do in a low inflationary environment, they 
showed that a central bank can do better than, say, simply setting the short rate at the 
larger of the Taylor rule rate and zero. That is, it succeeds in delivering more economic 
stability  by  promising,  following  a  period  of  deflation  and  a  zero  interest  rate,  to 
maintain a zero rate for a while even after the Taylor rule rate became positive. In a 
sense, the longer period of a zero rate compensates for the inability of the central bank 
to lower the rate into negative territory.   
Similar proposals have been made by Eggertson & Woodford (2003). Woodford 
(1999) already made essentially the same point in which he argued that “it is unlikely 
that monetary policy can do much to loosen the constraint imposed by the zero bound, 
except by changing what people expect policy to be like after the constraint ceases to 
bind.” This is exactly what strategy (i) seeks to achieve. Both Reifschneider & Williams 
and Eggertson & Woodford advocate the use of history-dependent policies whereby, for 
example, a period of a zero rate after the Taylor rule rate turns positive becomes longer, 
the longer the Taylor rule rate stays in negative territory. Somewhat unfortunately, the 
BOJ’s commitment is not explicitly history-dependent, except that phrases like “until 
deflationary concerns disappear” or “until inflation becomes stably above zero” have 
flavors of history dependence. We will come back to this point later. 
The most pioneering work in this field, however, is a series of papers by Krugman, 
for  example,  Krugman  (1998).  Other  works  that  followed  can  be  regarded  as 
restatements  and/or  refinements  of  the  Krugman  thesis.  Krugman  realizes  that  in  a 
liquidity trap it is useless to expand base money. Even if the economy is in a liquidity 
trap today, however, there is a chance that, say, due to an exogenous rise in the natural 
rate of interest, the economy will be out of the trap tomorrow. Once the economy is out 
                                                                                                                                                        
stock issuers’ fear of possible M&A type implications of the move. Stocks have been 
bought at the request of banks; hence, the purchases have not been used as an 
instrument of liquidity supplying operations by the BOJ.   9 
of the trap, a higher supply of base money raises the price level. Thus as long as the 
probability of the economy escaping the trap tomorrow is non-zero, a promise today to 
increase base money permanently may raise inflation expectations. A higher supply of 
money will actually affect the expected price level only when it is at, or it is promised to 
be raised to, unnecessarily high levels. The essence of this argument may be seen to be 
the same as that of Reifschneider and Williams. One is presented in terms of money, and 
the other, in terms of the interest rate—two sides of the same coin. In fact, Krugman 
(1998) argues that “if one views monetary policy in terms of nominal interest rates, a 
credible commitment to inflation can seem to be a pure bootstrap policy; interest rates 
need never fall; all that is required is a promise not to raise them when the economy 
expands and prices begin to rise.” Auerbach & Obstfeld (2005) make a similar remark 
about the importance of increasing base money permanently. To repeat, these authors 
essentially  advocate  the  use  of  strategy  (i),  expectations  management,  rather  than 
strategy (iii), expansion of base money. 
 
The  BOJ  started  its  ZIRP  in  April  1999,  i.e.,  before  the  Reifschneider  and 
Williams paper or the Woodford paper appeared. Thus, the ZIRP was not presented as 
clearly as in these works, especially relative to the Taylor rule. The resemblance to the 
Krugman proposal, however, was noted at a very early stage. For example, Ueda (1999) 
pointed out that “our stance is close to the one advocated by Paul Krugman. He argues 
in one of his recent articles that to achieve his recommendations, all one needs is to 
promise not to raise rates even if the economy starts to recover so long as the recovery 
is weak.” 
Thus, it is fair to say that the BOJ has been the first central bank to practice a 
version  of  strategy  (i)  as  advocated  by  these  authors.  One  weakness  of  the  BOJ 
approach was that the absence of the announcement of the target rate of inflation made 
the degree of commitment ambiguous. The BOJ exited from the ZIRP in August 2000 
after a tough discussion as to the appropriateness of timing. One cannot escape from the 
impression that the absence of an inflation target made the discussion confusing. 
To  summarize,  the  BOJ  did  not  adopt  the  ZIRP  at  the  recommendation  of  a 
particular  group  of  academic  economists  or  by  reference  to  their  work.  After  the 
inception of the ZIRP, however, it quickly realized the similarity of the policy to what 
Krugman was advocating.  Unfortunately, this similarity was left unnoticed by many 
academic economists, some of whom continued to recommend that the BOJ adopt a 
“bold” approach to end deflation. The lack of healthy dialogue between the BOJ and 
academia at an early stage seems to have been partially due to the vagueness of the   10 
BOJ’s approach, but equally to Krugman’s exposition of strategy (i) in terms of the 
quantity  of  money  rather  than  of  the  interest  rate.  Some  people  misunderstood  the 
Krugman proposal to be advocating strategy (iii) rather than strategy (i).
5 
 
6.  The Effects of the BOJ’s Monetary Policy 
The Effects of Strategies (i)-(iii) 
Let  us provide a brief  overview of the literature that has  tried to estimate the 
effects of the BOJ’s recent monetary policy. First, some authors have tried to estimate 
the  effects  of  the  most  important  element  of  the  recent  BOJ’s  approach,  i.e., 
expectations management, on the yield curve and the economy. This literature includes 
Oda & Kobayashi (2003), Bernanke, Reinhart and Sack (2004), Baba et al (2005), Oda 
& Nagahata (2005)  and Oda  & Ueda  (2005).  All  these  papers use a  macro-finance 
approach to estimate the effects of the ZIRP on the term structure of interest rates. 
As we discussed above, whether the ZIRP has affected expected future short-term 
interest rates is a subtle question than it first appears. Even without any commitment 
from the central bank, the market normally forms expectations about future monetary 
policy stance, i.e., the path of short rates. An expectation of deflation naturally leads to 
lower expected future short rates. Thus, one needs to show that the ZIRP have affected 
market’s  expectations  over  and  above  such  natural  response  of  the  market  to  the 
economy.  The  above  literature  makes  an  explicit  assumption  about  the  market’s 
perception of future monetary policy and estimates the levels of interest rates in the 
absence of ZIRP. Such estimates then provide a benchmark against which to gauge the 
effects of the ZIRP.   
In Oda & Ueda (2005) they use a macro-finance model that combines a small 
macroeconomic  model  with  a  finance  theory  approach  to  the  determination  of  risk 
premiums on long-term government bonds. The model consists of an aggregate demand 
and  supply  equations  and  a  monetary  policy  rule.  The  policy  rule  determines  the 
short-term interest rate, while aggregate demand is dependent on a moving average of 
past short-term interest rates. In the absence of commitment, the monetary policy rule is 
set to be a modified Taylor rule that incorporates slow policy adjustment and the zero 
bound constraint on interest rates. That is, the short rate is explicitly assumed to be 
nonnegative. The BOJ’s commitment to maintain a zero short rate until consumer price 
                                                    
5  As discussed in the previous section, the transmission channel (b) of strategy (iii) 
achieve something close to what strategy (i) tries to do. It seems fair to say, however, 
this use of strategy (iii) merely strengthens the effectiveness of strategy (i), rather than 
having an independent effect on asset prices. Empirical evidence reported in the next   11 
inflation becomes positive (the ZIRP) is modeled as maintenance of a zero rate until 
inflation exceeds a small positive number (henceforth, the threshold rate.) They assume 
that the threshold rate is variable over time and let the data determine its time path.
6 
The  model  is  estimated  by  the  maximum  likelihood  method  using  data  from 
1980:QI-1999:QI, that is, the data from the pre-ZIRP period.   
They next assume that the estimated coefficients stayed the same after 1999:QII 
and carry out simulations that gauge the impact of the ZIRP. Aggregate demand and 
supply curves contain demand and supply shocks, respectively. These shocks generate 
uncertainties concerning future short rate movements through the policy rule. The levels 
of long-term interest rates that contain resulting risk premiums are a function of the 
time-varying prices of the two risks and the threshold rate that determines the degree of 
the commitment effect. Given a set of these parameter values, Monte-Carlo simulations 
are  done  to derive  the  term structure of interest rates.  Parameters of  the  model are 
chosen so that the term structure of interest rates thus derived matches best with the data. 
They  then  calculate  the  expectations  component  of  interest  rates  by  running  the 
simulations again at chosen values of the parameters, but by assuming that people are 
risk  neutral.  The  difference  between  the  actual  and  the  estimated  expectations 
component is the risk premium component of interest rates. 
In order to see what would have happened in the absence of the ZIRP, they run 
simulations  again  for  the  period  after  1999:QII,  but  with  the  modified  Taylor  rule 
replacing the ZIRP. The differences between the simulation results with the ZIRP and 
the  modified  Taylor rule are their  estimates of the effects  of  the  ZIRP on  the  term 
structure of interest rates.   
Figure 2 compare the estimated levels of interest rates with and without the zero 
rate commitment. The figure presents the results for the expectations theory component.   
By looking at the figure, we find evidence of the effects of the ZIRP on expected future 
short rates. The expectations component of the rates is lower with the commitment at all 
maturities.  The  differences  between  the  two  cases  have  been  larger  since  the  third 
                                                                                                                                                        
section is consistent with such an interpretation. 
6  An alternative would be to assume that the threshold rate is fixed. This is probably closer to what 
the BOJ has been saying. Given that the ZIRP was the first implementation of such a policy 
framework, however, the market’s perception about the precise nature of the framework seems to 
have evolved over time. Under the RZIRP, the nature of the commitment has become more precise. 
The commitment to maintain ample liquidity supply until inflation becomes positive on a sustained 
basis must mean that the threshold rate is positive rather than strictly zero. The October 2003 change 
in the commitment to include a reference to expected inflation may have raised the threshold rate, 
although explicit formulation of the policy framework since then requires slightly different modeling. 
Needless to say, what is estimated as a change in the threshold rate may reflect a change in other 
parameters of the model that are not allowed to vary in this analysis.     12 
quarter  of  2002.  In  year  2003  expected  future  short  rates  without  the  zero  rate 
commitment went up sharply probably in response to improving economic conditions. 
But the commitment can be seen to have contained the increases to a significant extent. 
In general, the ZIRP implies a promise to maintain a zero rate for a while even after the 
modified Taylor rule rate has turned positive. Thus, the difference in expected three year 
rates, say, between the modified Taylor rule and ZIRP is small if the Taylor rule rate is 
expected to remain negative for three years or more. It becomes larger as investors start 
to price in the possibility of the Taylor rule rate turning positive within three years. If 
the  commitment is  believed to produce  a  temporary  period of  higher  inflation rates 
further into the future, the difference in rates at the ten  year horizon, say, could be 
smaller than at the three year horizon. This may have been the situation in 2003 as can 
be seen in the figure.   
In any case, it is at least clear that the ZIRP has produced strong effects on the 
expectations theory component of interest rates over and above those the combination 
of the modified Taylor rule and the stagnant economy have generated. The effects of the 
commitment on the risk premium component are much smaller. But the authors find 
some such effects on three to five year rates.   
The authors also examine whether or not other aspects of the QEP, purchases of 
JGBs and/or expansion of the CAB target, have had any effects on interest rates. They 
fail  to  find  any  significant  effects  of  the  BOJ’s  purchases  of  JGBs  on  either  the 
expectation or risk premium component of interest rates. In contrast, they find some 
evidence that the expansion of the target levels of the CABs have reduced the levels of 
the  expectations component  of  interest  rates.  The  interpretation of this  result  is not 
straightforward. One interpretation would be that increases in the target on the CAB 
provided  a  signaling  effect  as  to  the  willingness  of  the  BOJ  to  make  stronger 
commitment to a zero rate (channel (b) of strategy (iii)). It is also possible that other 
communication channels such as the  governor’s comments in press conferences that 
came out at the same time as the announcement of the changes in the target have been 
the driver of the effects found. Or else, indicators pointing to economic weakness may 
have led the market to raise the threshold rate, on the one hand, and, on the other, the 
BOJ to increase the target on the CAB. Unless the first interpretation is correct, the 
correlation they have found is a spurious one. 
In a separate work Bernanke, Reinhart and Sack (2004) also try to analyze the 
effects of the BOJ’s policy on interest rates, using a macro-finance approach. In the 
event study analysis they carry out, they find that the BOJ has not been using policy 
statements in a strategic manner to affect market expectations. As they admit, however,   13 
this may be due to a small sample size problem. In the same analysis they also find 
statistically significant links between the BOJ’s purchases of JGBs and JGB yields on 
the one hand, and between the QEP and stock prices, on the other.   
In addition,  Bernanke,  Reinhart and  Sach estimate a benchmark  term  structure 
model to look at the effects of the ZIRP and the QEP on interest rates. Theirs is also a 
macro-finance model in which the prices of risks of underlying factors are estimated 
based on the no-arbitrage assumption. Although their model does not take into account 
the ZLB constraint, they carry out simulations using the estimated model to predict the 
term structure of interest rates under the assumption that investors take into account the 
ZLB constraint. The simulations assume that investors demand higher yields on bonds 
as  rates  approach  the  ZLB  because  there  are  smaller  chances  of  capital  gains. 
Interestingly, the predicted yield curves lie above the actual yield curves after 1999. The 
deviation of the predicted from actual, however, narrows in November 2000 after the 
termination of the ZIRP, and widen again in June 2001 with the introduction of the QEP. 
 
The Effects of Attempts to Target Soft Spots in the Financial System 
          In contrast  to  the  above,  there has  been  less analysis of the prudential  policy 
aspect, as surveyed in section 4, of what the BOJ has been doing. Yet, some authors 
have looked at the effects of the BOJ’s policies on risk premiums. 
For  example, Baba,  Nakashima,  Shigemi and Ueda  (2005) have  looked  at  the 
relationship between the BOJ’s monetary policy and risk premiums banks pay in the 
money market. Specifically, they have analyzed movements over time of the dispersion 
of NCD (negotiable certificates of deposits) rates banks pay. As shown in Figure 3, the 
dispersion rose to very high levels during the period of a financial crisis in 1997-1998, 
declined sharply during the ZIRP period, rose somewhat at the termination of the ZIRP, 
and declined again during the QE period to a level lower than that during the ZIRP 
period. They also show that the decline in the dispersion cannot be fully attributed to 
improvements of credit standings of Japanese banks after 1999. 
 
Consequently,  the  BOJ’s  monetary  policy  seems  to  have  lowered  the  risk 
premiums demanded of banks in the money market. The exact mechanism by which 
monetary policy lowered the dispersion of  money  market rates  needs to be  studied 
further. It is quite likely, however, that the ZIRP, by its promise to keep a zero rate until 
deflation ends, has brought down concerns over liquidity availability and thus lowered 
risk  premiums.  The  further  decline  in  the  rate  dispersion  during  the  QEP  period 
indicates the role played by increased quantity of base money. Whether it is purely a   14 
result of large excess reserves, or of some targeted asset purchases carried out during the 
period is difficult to determine. An example of the latter would be the very long-dated 
fund supplying operations carried out during the period. As of April 2001, the start of 
the QEP period, fund supplying operations had maturities of one to three months. In 
March  2005,  some  operations  were  of  11  month  maturity.  Such  lengthening  of  the 
tender of operations seems to have had some direct effects on money market interest 
rates.   
Baba et al. (2005) have looked at spreads on CPs and corporate bonds during the 
period and compared them with those in the U.S. today and back in the 1930s. It is 
interesting  to  point  out  that  the  U.S.  in  the  1930s  also  witnessed  some  short-term 
interest rates falling to near zero levels. For example, the TB rate was virtually zero in 
the mid 1930s. The authors find that the spreads in today’s Japan are much lower than 
those in the U.S. today or in the 1930s. They do not go on to discuss the reason for this 
finding. The BOJ’s massive operations in CPs, however, must have had a significant 
impact on their yields—use of strategy (ii). The BOJ has not purchased corporate bonds 
directly. Hence, any effect the BOJ’s policy may have had on corporate bond spreads 
must have been spillover effects from declines in yields on instruments the BOJ has had 
more powerful influence on such as JGBs. In any case, with the exception of 1998, 
prohibitively large increases in risk premiums in the money and bond market seem to 
have been avoided. 
 
The results of the works surveyed in this section do not match one for one, but 
they seem to be in broad agreement that the commitment channel contained in the ZIRP, 
strategy (i), has been effective since 1999. The commitments made by the BOJ have 
affected expected future short rates and, as a result, current medium- to long-term rates 
on  government  bonds.  There  is  some  evidence  that  liquidity  expansion  may  have 
strengthened the commitment channel and/or affected stock prices. It may also have led 
to declines in risk premiums in the money market. Evidence is mixed on the effects of 
targeted  asset  purchases  on  asset  prices,  especially  so,  on  the  relationship  between 
purchases of long-term government bonds and bond yields. There is evidence that the 
BOJ’s attempts to contain risk premiums in the financial system have had some success, 
especially in terms of reducing risk premiums in the money market. 
 
7.    Limitations of the Measures Adopted 
  Despite evidence of the presence of the effects of the BOJ’s monetary policy on 
the  economy  as  surveyed  in  the  last  section,  casual  observation  suggests  that  these   15 
effects have not been as large as one would have hoped. After all, the economy is still in 
deflation at the time of the writing of this article. It has shown signs of improvement 
since the middle of 2003; it remains to be seen, however, whether these improvements 
are self sustainable, leading inflation into positive territory. Let us discuss here some 
possible  reasons  behind  the  limited  power  of  the  BOJ’s  policies  to  stimulate  the 
economy. 
  The discussion will be divided into two parts. First, I discuss some of 
the  essential  difficulties  associated  with  the  expectations  management 
approach, the core component of the BOJ’s policy during this period. Second, 
I  turn  to  the  review  of  how  financial  sector  problems  have  limited  and 
affected the BOJ’s policy measures during the period.   
 
Problems with Expectations Management 
          The approach to managing or shaping expectations of future monetary policy as 
described above has its own limitations. First, it requires forces other than monetary 
policy to lift the economy out of the liquidity trap. This is evident in our presentation of 
the  Krugman  framework.  Should  the  probability of  the  economy  getting  out  of  the 
liquidity trap tomorrow be zero, a promise of a higher money supply will do no good. 
This means that, depending on what will happen to exogenous shocks, or in other words, 
to the natural rate of interest, the economy under strategy (i) could be stuck at a zero 
interest rate for an embarrassingly long period of time. The problem would be even 
more serious with a strong history-dependent rule. The BOJ has been essentially unable 
to exit from the ZIRP for more than 6 years.
7  Needless to say, however, the situation 
would have been worse if the BOJ had followed a simple Taylor rule type policy.   
          The second serious problem with the expectations management approach is that it 
may not be time consistent. This is again clear in our presentation of the Krugman 
proposal.  It  is  a  promise  of  monetary  expansion  when  the  economy  is  out  of  the 
liquidity trap that generates easing effects. A central bank, however, that finds that the 
economy is out of the trap may not want to carry out the promised monetary expansion. 
In  other words,  a central  bank  that  uses the approach  needs  to  commit  to  a  higher 
inflation target than usual, or accept the risk of inflation temporarily overshooting the 
target. In either case, the central bank has an incentive to renege on its promises. Some 
may want to point to the August 2000 termination of the ZIRP as an example of such 
difficulties.   
          The above two problems combined generate a further problem when the terms of 
                                                    
7  I mean with the exception of the August 2000-March 2001 period.   16 
policy board members are finite. For example, in the BOJ case the terms are five years. 
If a policy like the ZIRP involves a strong commitment about policy instrument for a 
period longer than five years, and if the policy had an element of time inconsistency, it 
raises obvious problems. M. King (2004) discussed a similar problem by saying that 
whether  or  not  collective  decision  making  today  can  bind  those  of  future  decision 
makers is a difficult question. Needless to say, this problem is mitigated by staggering 
the appointments of board members. People, however, seem to have weak memories of, 
and attachment to, measures that they did not directly vote for. 
          It remains to be seen how serious these issues will be for the BOJ in its fight 
against  deflation.  After  all,  in  order  to  mitigate  the  difficulties  generated  by  these 
problems, the BOJ’s  current  commitment includes  a fairly specific  set  of necessary 
conditions  for  an  exit  from  the  QEP—actual  core  CPI  inflation  needs  to  become 
positive on a sustained basis and inflation forecasts of board members also need to 
become positive. 
 
Banking Sector Problems and Monetary Policy 
We have pointed out that severe banking problems have lowered the effectiveness 
of the BOJ’s monetary policy during the period. To be sure, declines in bank loans have 
partially been a result of the weakness of the economy, but they have also been due to 
the balance sheet problems of lenders and borrowers caused mainly by decreases in 
asset  prices.  This  mechanism  has  acted  as  a  negative  financial  accelerator.  That  is, 
declines in land and stock prices and the weak economy led to a vicious cycle, through 
their effects on the balance sheets of lenders and borrowers. 
As I have discussed in this paper, the BOJ has naturally tried to alleviate financial 
sector  problems  using  various  options  available.  Many  of  the  measures  adopted, 
strategies (i)-(iii), have had the dual role of generating favorable monetary policy effects 
and  of  containing  financial  sector  problems.  As  we  saw  in  the  last  section,  risk 
premiums, especially, in the money market, have declined to very low levels. Thanks 
partially to these efforts, the repeat of the 1998 type credit crunch has been avoided.   
Despite the containment of risk premiums in the bond market, the sense that many 
firms  were  credit  constrained  remained.  In  order  to  understand  this,  one  needs  to 
understand the segmented nature of the Japanese credit market.  During most of the 
period  under  discussion,  banks  continued  to  lend  to  companies  with  good  credit 
standing. The corporate bonds market for these borrowers has also existed and spreads 
have not risen to prohibitive levels. Essentially, these borrowers have not faced serious 
credit constraints except for 1997-1998.     17 
Other than this segment of the financial system, there has not been much new 
lending. The bond market for firms with ratings below BBB has not existed. Nagahata 
and  Sekine  (2002)  present  evidence  that  the  balance  sheet  problems  have  exerted 
significant negative effects on the investment activities of companies that do not have 
access  to  the  bond  market,  that  is,  small  and  medium  sized  companies.  Capital 
limitation has made it difficult for banks to fully realize loan losses. As a result, the 
secondary market for loans has not developed much.   
The  BOJ’s  easing  as  we  have  reviewed  in  this  paper  did  have  the  effect  of 
lowering,  or  containing  the  rise  in,  risk  premiums  in  relatively  sound  parts  of  the 
financial  system.  Such  declines  in  risk  premiums  in  the  money  and  bond  markets, 
however, have not led to risk taking elsewhere, i.e., to increased bank lending to those 
borrowers who have not had access to the open money and capital markets. Instead, 
funds  that  have  left  the  Japanese  money  and  bond  markets  have  been  invested  in 
relatively safe instruments such as U.S. treasuries, with the currency position hedged. In 
this sense, the BOJ’s operations have not been able to address fully the problems in the 
weakest parts of the financial system, or their ability to generate easing effects has been 
constrained by the latter. Things would have been different had Japan possessed more 
developed open capital markets. It seems fair to say, however, the measures adopted by 
the BOJ as discussed here have at least had the effect of preventing the meltdown of the 
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Figure 2: Expectations Theory Components of Medium / Long-term Interest Rates 
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Footnote for Chart 3 
 
Notes: 1. 
  The above data are for the following major city banks, long-term credit banks, and trust 
banks for which weekly data are available throughout the above periods: Sumitomo Mitsui 
Banking  Corporation,  the  Bank  of  Tokyo-Mitsubishi,  UFJ  Bank,  Resona  Bank,  Shinsei 
Bank, Aozora Bank, the Mitsubishi Trust and Banking Corporation, the Sumitomo Trust & 
Banking,  Mizuho  Trust  &  Banking,  UFJ  Trust  Bank,  and  the  Chuo  Mitsui  Trust  and 
Banking Company.    Data for Fuji Bank and Mizuho Bank are excluded, as a large portion 
of their NCDs were issued to local governments. For Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation 
prior to its merger, data for the former Sumitomo Bank are used.   
 
Note: 2. 
  The following periods are considered to be “event periods” and data for these periods are excluded from 
the calculation: (1) the end of 1999 (Y2K problem); (2) the end of 2000 (preparation for the introduction 
of  Real  Time  Gross  Settlement;  (3)  the  end  of  fiscal  2001  (the  partial  removal  of  blanket  deposit 
insurance).    When there are missing data for a given bank in a calculation period, that bank is excluded 
from the calculation.   
 